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I. Introduction 
 
For a long-time, regular teacher of a course in the ethics of war like me, this is a very 
important book. Jeff McMahan has an excellent mind, great learning in the criminal law 
of murder, self-defense, justification and excuses, in international law, and in the moral 
and legal aspects of just war theory. These combine to allow him to acquaint readers 
like me with a new position in just war theory, one I desperately wanted to discover. 
This is because I had become so disaffected with the positions I have known up to now. 
Let me explain this point about possible positions. 
 
II. The Spectrum of Positions on War 
 
Up to now, I had distinguished four distinctly different positions in the ethics of war: 
 
1) The first is the total war position, usually the result of the mindset of 
moral and political realism.  Inter arma silent leges (In the times of war, 
the law is silent). This apparently was the position of General Paul Tibbets, 
the pilot of the plane dropping the atomic bomb on the city and civilians of 
Hiroshima, when he said, “there is no morality in war” (p. 129 in 
McMahan). This position rejects all attempts to restrain the evils of war.  
 
2) Classical just war theory attempts to restrain the evils of war while 
allowing war. I too want to allow war but to restrain its evils. So I tend to 
accept just war theory. 
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The most basic way just war theory restrains the evils of war is, first, to distinguish 
good (defense) and bad (aggression) moral reasons for going to war, jus ad bellum.  
Then, second, to distinguish good (never attack civilians, do only proportionate harm to 
the enemy) and bad (attack civilians, cause any amount of unlimited harm) moral 
reasons for tactics in war, jus in bello.  
 
The most popular current version of just war theory is found in Michael Walzer’s 1977 
book, Just and Unjust Wars. This has usually been the beginning text in my courses in 
the ethics of war. I have always accepted his endorsement of the key provision of jus ad 
bellum, that once a war has begun, all the combatants are moral equals, both the 
fighters for the just defending side and the fighters for the unjust aggressing side. And I 
have enthusiastically accepted Walzer’s doctrine that the moral norms for war are 
principally found in the deontological realm of human rights, and not in the teleological 
realm of utilitarian calculation. But Walzer deserts human rights norms and accepts the 
utilitarian doctrine of “supreme emergency” when defeat threatens. This doctrine holds 
that the side with jus ad bellum justification is morally permitted, if it has been 
restrained by jus in bello norms in the course of the war for some time, but is in the end 
about to lose the war, to violate jus in bello. Walzer’s prime example of this is Britain’s 
decision to bomb German cities, intending the sufferings and deaths of German 
civilians, when it seemed in 1940 that Nazi Germany would defeat Britain. Walzer’s 
just war position, one version of classical just war theory, is thus the second on my 
spectrum. 
 
3) Dissatisfied with Walzer’s allowance of the in extremis violation of jus in 
bello by the side possessing jus ad bellum, I have felt more comfortable 
endorsing the traditional Catholic understanding of just war theory. This is 
because it prohibits the intentional and direct targeting of civilians, even 
though it might allow foreseen but unintended harms to civilians according 
to the principle of the double effect. This position was stated during WW II 
in criticism of British, then American, bombing of German cities by John C. 
Ford, a Jesuit priest, in his famous dissenting essay, “The Morality of 
Obliteration Bombing.”  This traditional Catholic just war position, a 
second version of classical just war theory, is the third on my spectrum of 
possible positions in the ethics of war. 
 
4) The fourth position is pacifism, the rejection of all and any war. This 
holds that contemporary war is so drastically destructive that it is morally 
impermissible to go to war at all, no matter how just one’s jus ad bellum 
satisfying cause, or how stringent the tactical restraints of jus in bello 
observed.  This is Gandhi’s position. It demands that defenders against evil 
use only non-violent ways of resisting, though it also does demand that they 
resist. 
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Though I have tried to hold the third position, the Catholic version of just war theory 
rather than Walzer‘s second version, I have long been moving towards the acceptance 
of the fourth position, pacifism. This is because I find so few just wars, especially so 
few in American military history. It seems to me that almost any version of just war 
theory justifies too much. The dead in 19th century wars tended to be 90% combatants 
and only 10% civilians, but the 20th century has brought a nearly complete reversal, 
more like 90% civilians dead and only 10% combatants. This leads me to reject almost 
any contemporary war as morally impermissible, for the current military strategies of 
every nation, as far as I can tell, move more and more towards protecting soldiers at the 
expense of endangering civilians.  
 
But I am not willing to fully espouse pacifism and renounce war altogether. I agree that 
Hitler’s Nazi German armies had to be defeated, and that the only way was military 
defeat. Also, in wanting to accept some version of just war theory, I keep constantly in 
mind a much more current example of the need to defeat evil militarily. This was the 
moral necessity I saw in the efforts of the Sandinista military,  in 1980’s Nicaragua, to 
defeat the cruel, lawless, human rights-obliterating, American-created and directed 
Contras.  
 
Unhappy that the popularly-supported Sandinistas led a revolution that overthrew the 
American-backed dictator, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, President Reagan created the 
Contras from members of Somoza’s defeated National Guard. The Sandinista 
government, partially inspired by Latin American liberation theology, made enormous 
improvements to benefit the poor, in education in literacy, health care, land ownership, 
agricultural technology, and farming practices.  In order to defeat the democratically 
elected, popularly supported Sandinistas, President Reagan armed, trained, positioned 
and directed the counterrevolutionary Contras in the hope of destroying the Sandinistas 
revolutionary gains. From their U.S. protected sanctuaries in Honduras, the Contras 
made forays into Nicaragua. They targeted the enormously-valued Sandinista 
successes. The Contras destroyed the new medical clinics and killed the health 
promoters. They destroyed the new schoolhouses and killed the university student 
volunteers teaching literacy there and the liberation theology catechists. They destroyed 
the new and prosperous Sandinista cooperative farms by conquering their armed, 
citizen-soldier, farmer defenders. But the Sandinistas instituted a military draft and sent 
soldiers out from Managua to defend the revolutionary improvements in their Northern 
region. The Sandinista combatants fought their defensive war bravely and well, for the 
Contras could never permanently hold any Nicaraguan territory. The Sandinista 
military protected the people and their new revolutionary institutions and helped the 
Sandinistas drive the Contras back across the Honduran border. Were it not for the 
military might of the intervening United States, it is widely believed that the 
Sandinistas could have crossed the Honduran border, confronted the Contras in battles 
at their camps, soundly defeated them, and would have won while respecting all the jus 
in bello norms for fair combat.  
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5) I have reached the point in my personal account to explain my pleasant 
excitement in discovering Jeff McMahon’s Killing in War. I count 
McMahan’s just war position as a new one, new at least to me. As I have 
explained, I wanted to hold the classical just war position but was 
enormously disappointed in Walzer’s version of it, and somewhat 
disappointed in the older Catholic version of it. This being the case, I was 
driven towards accepting pacifism, but the example of stopping Hitler’s 
armies and Reagan’s Contras forced me to stop short of accepting it. I 
needed to discover, or to work out for myself, a more restraining and less 
permissive version of just war theory. This is what I am delighted to find in 
McMahan. Its essential feature is the denial of the position held jointly by 
both Walzer’s and the Catholic and, indeed, the classical versions of just 
war theory. That position McMahon, quoting Walzer, calls “the moral 
equality of combatants.” It is the doctrine that combatants fighting for the 
unjust aggressive cause are nevertheless the moral equals of the combatants 
fighting for the defensive just cause. Traditionally, the war is the politicians, 
and only the conduct of the war is the soldiers. Traditionally, the soldiers do 
and should obey their political authorities in going to war. If their political 
leaders order their armies to fight for an unjust cause, all the moral fault and 
legal liability is in the leaders. Nazi machine-gunner and American 
machine-gunner firing at one another are equally innocent of wrongdoing, 
are moral equals equally entitled to soldierly respect. Jus in bello norms are 
the same for both, as is their equal title to respect for following those norms. 
 
McMahan’s new position creates for me a new spectrum of possible positions on the 
morality of war. There are now five instead of four and I hold the new fourth position, 
McMahan’s. Now there is for me:  
 
1. Total war  
2. Walzer’s version of just war theory  
3. The Catholic version of just war theory  
4. McMahan’s version of just war theory (which I now adopt), and  
5. Pacifism.  
 
When I use the phrase, classical just war theory, as I now proceed to recount 
McMahan’s position, I mean by it what is common to both Walzer’s position and the 
traditional Catholic position. What is this new position Jeff McMahan works out in 
Killing in War? 
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III. The Morality of Participation in an Unjust War 
 
This is the title of McMahan’s first chapter. In it, to my mind, he refutes the doctrine of 
“the moral equality of combatants.” Walzer had used “the domestic analogy” to refute 
the total war position. That is, we only approve of the possible lethality of the victim or 
the police shooting at the attempted murderer, not the possible lethality of the attempted 
murderer shooting back at the police or at his designated victim. To Walzer, by 
analogy, this means that only the nation at war that is like the victim, the defending 
nation, has jus ad bellum, justice in going to war. The nation at war that is like the 
attempted murderer, the aggressor in the war, lacks jus ad bellum, and was wrong to go 
to war and to begin the war. Thus, there is no moral equality between the two nations at 
war, assuming that they do not both lack jus ad bellum. One is simply wrong, the other 
right. However, to both Walzer’s and the Catholic position, both the combatants of the 
aggressor nation and of the defending nation are moral equals even if their nations are 
not. 
 
Walzer uses “the domestic analogy” to discover this. McMahan wonders why Walzer 
prematurely arrested the use of this analogy in making only the judgment between right 
and wrong warring nations. McMahan’s brilliance is in showing that the domestic 
analogy should be further applied to make the distinction between right and wrong 
warring individual combatants fighting for their respective nations. That is to say, just 
combatants do and should fight for just causes and in the defense of their jus ad bellum 
respecting nations. But although unjust combatants do fight with present legal 
protection, nevertheless they should refuse to fight for the immoral and unjust causes of 
their jus ad bellum violating, aggressor nations. This means that the just combatant is 
not the moral equal but the moral superior of the inferior unjust combatant. The just 
combatant may rightfully attack the unjust combatant, but the unjust combatant may not 
rightfully attack the just combatant. Even prior to this actual firing of weapons, the 
combatant recruited, conscripted, ordered, used to wage unjust war, should have been a 
selective conscientious objector and should have refused military service. McMahan 
holds that if every would-be aggressor nation finds itself with no willing unjust 
warriors, then it will not be able to wage unjust wars. 
 
The way McMahan demonstrates that the domestic analogy, correctly applied, demands 
this outcome, is through his masterful explanations of the relevant concepts in domestic 
criminal law. He is amazing in his clear, careful, definitions, distinctions and divisions 
of the kinds of (the list is long): innocence, threats, proportion, discrimination, defense, 
justifications (subjective and objective), excuses (full and partial), desert, liability, 
responsibility, duress, punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, rights (waived, forfeited, 
overridden, infringed, violated), intending, allowing, causing, necessary and sufficient 
conditions for outcomes, objective wrongs.    
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For instance, classical just war theory claims that the criterion of one’s liability to be 
attacked in war is that one poses a threat to others. But McMahan shows that this 
cannot be correct, for a police officer with draw pistol poses a threat to the murderer 
she arrests. Police officers properly doing their jobs are not liable to be attacked 
because they are innocent. One is innocent if one is neither morally responsible for, nor 
guilty of, a wrong, a violation of another’s rights.  The criterion of liability to be 
attacked in war is the same as in self-defense in domestic life. It is moral responsibility 
for an objectively unjustified threat of harm to an innocent person.  
 
 Murderers are liable to be attacked because they are non-innocent threats to others. 
Thus it is that just combatants, unlike murderers, are innocent and may not be attacked. 
On the other hand, unjust combatants are as objectively non-innocent as murderers, or 
attempting murderers, and so are liable to attack in self-defense. The justification for 
killing in war is the same as the justification for killing in domestic, individual self-
defense. Combatants for a just cause are just combatants and, as innocent, retain their 
rights not to be harmed, but, like police, just combatants have the right to harm unjust 
combatants. Combatants for an unjust cause are unjust combatants, have forfeited the 
right not to be harmed, and have in no way acquired the right to harm the just 
combatants that their aggression has made their enemies, or rather, has made their 
would-be victims. No person has a right of defense against a threatened harm to which 
he or she has made himself or herself liable. This is as true in war as it is in civil 
society. Once having fired the shots to begin an unjust war, the aggressively attacking 
unjust combatant has no right to return the fire against him in self-defense. 
  
And there is not only the above jus ad bellum reason for this, but there are jus in bello 
reasons as well. The jus in bello criteria are discrimination (civilians may never be 
attacked) and proportionality (the harms one inflicts must be proportioned to the good 
one achieves). The reason why civilians may never be attacked is because they are 
innocent. But just combatants are also innocent. Discrimination thus demands that they 
may never be attacked. And proportionality also demands that just combatants may 
never be attacked. Unjust combatants seek to further an unjust or evil cause, but 
proportionality can only justify some measure of evil if it is the means to a great good. 
But the end an unjust combatant seeks is a great evil, not a great good, so it cannot 
justify any of the harms an unjust combatant might inflict on a just combatant. 
McMahan thus shows, contrary to classical just war theory, that the jus in bello 
requirements of discrimination and proportionality are not separable from, and 
independent of, the jus ad bellum norm.  
 
However, there is an exception to this. The just combatant defending the just cause 
might violate jus in bello by using unjust means. These would be tactics like bombing 
the enemy civilians of the unjust side, just like Britain and then the U.S. intentionally 
bombed German then Japanese civilians. In this case the German fighter planes trying 
to knock the American bombers over Dresden out of the sky would be justified. These 
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otherwise unjust German combatants become temporarily just combatants when they 
defended their innocent civilians against their non-innocent American attackers whose 
deliberate violation of discrimination made them liable to be attacked.   
 
But here another key distinction can be important. If the American bombers intended to 
bomb only a genuinely military German target, like a munitions plant, then 
proportional, unintended but foreseen destruction of German civilian lives and 
property, would be justified (by the principle of the double effect). It would then be 
wrong for the German fighter planes to knock these American bombers out of the sky 
in defense of these innocent German civilians. This is because it would violate both 
discrimination   and proportionality if they did so. That is, the German fighter planes 
would do some good if they saved the lives of the German civilians, but the evil that 
they would do in protecting the munitions factory arming unjust combatants, and 
making possible the triumph of the aggressive unjust cause, would be a great evil. Also, 
the reason the civilians are liable to be accidentally bombed is because of the unjust war 
their side’s unjust combatants began. The unjust combatants are morally responsible for 
their own civilians’ deaths. 
 
Strictly speaking, apart from the above exception, only just combatants and not unjust 
combatants are held to the jus in bello norms allowing discriminating and proportionate 
attacks. This is because morality disallows unjust combatants from attacking at all. 
There are no norms for the right way to murder. However, McMahan holds, as long as 
the convention, though in error, assumes the moral equality of combatants, of aggressor 
and defender alike, that it is still important to hold aggressors morally and legally liable 
for violating jus in bello discrimination and proportionality. This threat of liability 
would at least deter unjust aggressors, who are always unjust threats to just defenders, 
from becoming, in addition, predators on innocent civilians of the justly defending 
nation. 
 
 
IV. Arguments for the Moral Equality of Combatants 
 
This is the title of McMahan’s second chapter. In it, he reviews the arguments for the 
classical just war theorists’ position that both the combatants for the aggressors and the 
defenders in a war are moral equals. Then he attempts, successfully to my mind, to 
refute these arguments. That he refutes them means that it is not morally permissible for 
combatants to bear arms to further an aggressor’s unjust cause. Here are some samples 
of these arguments and his refutations. 
 
1. Combatants on both sides are like fighters in a boxing match who waive the right not 
to be attacked. Or, close to this, wearing a uniform means one waives the right not to be 
attacked. McMahan’s reply: Combatants for a just defensive cause, think of Polish 
soldiers in 1939, do not give Nazi soldiers the right or permission to attack them or 
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their country. In fact, the reason the Poles become combatants is to prevent the Nazi’s 
from violating these Polish rights. Making the situation worse, as the Nazi’s attack the 
right to life-retaining Polish soldiers, they violate Polish civilians rights to life, security 
and property in numerous ways. 
 
2. The combatants on both sides are like the gladiators who fight one another in the 
Roman Coliseum, both having waived the right to be killed. McMahan’s reply: This 
argument might apply only to child soldiers who are forced to fight under pain of death. 
In no other sorts of actual wars are the combatants captive slaves being forced to fight. 
Moreover, neither the children nor the gladiators are consenting to be killed. Those 
forcing the children or gladiators to fight do not force them to waive their rights; they 
simply violate their rights. Owners of property do not waive their right to it as they 
hand it over to a threatening armed robber.  The claim that there is a forced waiver of 
rights is no more plausible than the claim that the victim raped at knifepoint waives her 
right to refuse sex. 
 
3. The combatants for the unjust cause are the moral equals of the just defenders 
because they cannot know whether their cause is just or not. Only their leaders, who are 
more intelligent than the average citizen, in possession of secret intelligence, and have 
the leisure to study situations, can know. McMahan’s reply: Some wars are obviously 
unjust to average citizens. The WW II German invasions of Poland, Belgium, France, 
and the Sudetenland were known as clearly unjust to the average German citizen. 
Americans have many now well-known examples (the Pentagon Papers, the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution, the G.W. Bush claims about Saddam’s weapons of mass 
destruction) of their government lying to them to move them towards war. Citizens 
should be alert to the probability that the government moving them to go to war far 
from home is lying. However, a significant and continuing part of McMahan’s entire 
argument is a call to citizens and soldiers to become more careful deliberators about 
their nation’s jus ad bellum claims, and suggestions of helps to becoming more critical. 
 
4. There is a role duty of soldiers or citizens, those already members of a just 
institution, like the military or a democracy, to do nothing to block its efficient 
functioning. Therefore, they must go to war even for an unjust cause if the institution so 
orders them. McMahan’s reply: The duty not to kill innocent people outweighs this sort 
of role duty. Also, this duty is generated only within a just military institution, not an 
unjust one violating jus ad bellum. Also, unjust wars are highly damaging to a military 
institution. Selective conscientious objection to fighting in this particular war might 
stop this damage and bring the institution back to its just form. Also, granting soldiers 
the right to refuse to participate in an unjust war has not destroyed the Israeli military or 
Israeli democracy. 
 
5. Citizens and soldiers have transferred the individual right to kill in war and domestic 
affairs to the state, and must obey the state when it so orders. McMahan’s reply: 
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Individuals never possessed the right to kill others unjustly and so cannot transfer such 
a right to the state. Even if the state authority claims to accept all the responsibility and 
all the legal liability for ordering the killing, if the commander has no right to kill, then 
his order does not justify or permit the soldier to kill. Only a principal who has a right 
can delegate that right to a subordinate agent. 
 
6. If a soldier can disobey an order to fight in an unjust war, then that soldier can 
disobey an order not to fight in a just war. McMahan’s reply: This decision not to fight 
should be made by a representative institution because of the great consequences to all. 
A dissatisfied individual may resign and fight with another organization if her nation 
refuses to fight a just war. Americans thus joined the Abraham Lincoln Brigade to fight 
against Nazi supported Franco in the 1930’s Spanish civil war. Also, fighting for an 
unjust cause would be doing evil, and not fighting for a just cause would be allowing 
evil, and it is more of a duty not to do evil than it is a duty not to allow evil. 
 
The outcome of these six failed arguments for the moral equality of combatants is that 
our citizens and soldiers have, and McMahan and I hold that we moral philosophers 
should teach, the duty of conscientious refusal. The citizens who have sent soldiers to 
war should teach them that soldiers can possibly be made instruments of immoral 
policies. Soldiers are already thought to be able to recognize when they should refuse in 
matters of jus in bello, so they can be taught how to recognize when they should refuse 
in matters of jus ad bellum. It is false that jus in bello law is clearer than jus ad bellum 
law. Besides, disobedience in jus ad bellum could prevent a war from beginning and 
thus would be less disruptive than disobedience in jus in bello after the war has already 
begun.  
 
We already allow the right of conscientious objection to fighting in any and all war, and 
allow it to prevent the conscription (primarily) of members of the traditional peace 
churches--Quakers, Church of the Brethren, the Mennonites. We should extend this to 
become a right corresponding to the duty of conscientious refusal. Those already in the 
military should have the right to select and refuse to participate in those wars that they 
judge to violate jus ad bellum. They would not need to assert religious membership or 
religious reasons for this refusal. It would not affect the possibility of a strong and just 
defense when another nation wrongly commits aggression against us. As the Nazi 
armies invaded Poland, loyal Poles flocked to army recruiters to fight to remedy the 
injustice. This is a very common reaction to a country’s unjust invaders. 
 
To help our citizens decide when to claim this right of conscientious refusal, McMahan 
repeats a key suggestion in many parts of his book. There should be an impartial world 
court whose primary function is to decide and pronounce judgments about jus ad 
bellum. This would not be the presently existing World Court at The Hague and it 
would not be the United Nations Security Council. If one or more nations had gone to 
war, or, better, wished to go to war, they would argue their cases for doing so before 
Essays Philos (2011) 12:1                                                                                                         Betz | 156 
 
 
this new court. The well-publicized decision of the court would be that tone side had 
jus ad bellum and that the other side lacked it, or maybe that both sides lacked it. The 
court would typically say that this side fights wrongly as the aggressor and that that side 
fights rightly as the defender. This would be the legal and moral justification for the 
soldiers of the aggressor nation to conscientiously refuse to fight for their nation in the 
war.  There would be fewer wars if this court existed, and much less aggression, 
because far fewer individuals would consent to be unjust combatants. However, this 
would also make wars of humanitarian intervention clearly justified to the entire world.  
 
 
V. Excuses 
 
McMahan’s third chapter is on excuses. He asks why do most of us think that only high 
Nazi officials, not ordinary unjust Nazi combatants, deserved punishment. His answer 
is that most of us conflate the morality of war with the legality of war. The morality of 
war makes moral rights more important than good consequences. The legality of war 
makes good consequences more important than moral rights. That is, the way the law of 
war has developed, it tries hard to limit the horrible consequences of war, even if one 
warring nation is wrong about its moral right to go to war. Thus, the law of war allows 
unjust combatants to fight as long as they respect jus ad bello, and thus at least partially 
restricts the harms unjust combatants cause. But it limits some of these possible harms 
of war by giving unjust combatants a legal excuse for fighting. However, McMahan 
holds, if the law of war were brought closer to the morality of war, the unjust 
combatants could see that they were violating the just combatants’ moral rights not to 
be attacked. Then unjust combatants would be criminally liable for attacking and would 
have no excuse. Yet, in the present circumstances that wrongly assume the moral 
equality of combatants, it is better to keep the present jus in bello norms neutral in 
applying to both just and unjust combatants. For, in present circumstances, what is 
legally permitted for just combatants also will be done by unjust combatants. 
Consequently, even if the unjust combatants were not restrained from going to war, 
they will be constrained in how they fight in the war. 
 
In this matter of excuses, McMahan believes that an important reason for the 
widespread acceptance of the moral equality of combatants is the conflation of 
permission and excuse. What is permitted is what it is not wrong to do. What is excused 
is what was wrong to do but one is fully or partially blameless for doing it.  It follows 
that the just combatant doing what is permitted and the unjust combatant with a 
complete excuse are morally equivalent in blamelessness, even though the first does 
right and the second wrong. Moral equivalence in blamelessness is not the same as 
moral equivalence in justification but is confused with it. 
 
McMahan examines the unjust combatant in relation to the three grounds for excuse. 1. 
Is the unjust combatant excused by duress? This might be general societal pressures, 
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the pressure that causes the poor to seek out military careers, conscription, already 
being in the army before that army is wrongly deployed, meeting the expectations of 
one’s family and peers to avoid shame. Still, democracies do not usually generate the 
duress of physical threats that totalitarian countries do.  McMahan thinks that the duress 
generated by the severe punishments of already enlisted soldiers for refusing to obey 
orders to participate in aggressive wars is proof of the government’s knowledge of the 
wrongness of those wars. 2. Is the unjust combatant excused by epistemic limitation? 
The unquestioning obedience which is a part of military training generates some degree 
of epistemic limitation. Also, one might well be ignorant of the facts concerning jus ad 
bellum, but this is vincible and culpable ignorance where there is freedom of speech, 
the press, and inquiry. And surely, those in the officer class suffer much less epistemic 
limitation than does the enlisted man or woman. However, it is true that that the highest 
authorities like Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush have lied to our nation in order 
to move us to unjust war. 3. Is the unjust combatant a person of diminished 
responsibility? This might be true of teen-age soldiers but rarely true of more mature 
soldiers. But the entire military culture does promote the habit of unquestioning 
obedience. 
 
 McMahan holds that even if the unjust combatant is affected by all three sources of 
excuses, that combatant is not excused from committing a war crime by them. If these 
sources of excuses do not excuse in the usual case of jus in bello, they should not 
excuse in the usual case involving jus ad bellum.  
 
McMahan has much to say to justify his skepticism about all these sources of excuse, 
holding that, at best, they excuse partially and not fully. A major source of his 
skepticism is his belief that even the average person cognizant of the history of wars 
could readily see that almost all wars are begun by aggressors and their unjust 
combatants, and that often enough the citizen’s own nation was the aggressor. His 
reading of this history suggests this rule of thumb that one can use to avoid being an 
unjust combatant. If you would be fighting in a foreign country and not in your home 
country, and if that foreign country did not invade another country, and if the foreign 
country’s combatants are supported by most of the natives of that country and find their 
own safety among them, then you are probably bring asked to be an unjust combatant 
in a war of aggression. Think of the U.S. wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan in 
relation to this rule. In order not to be a new generation of Adolph Eichmann’s, soldiers 
have a duty to deliberate carefully about the wars they are asked to fight.  McMahan 
thinks that when soldiers have not carefully deliberated before and during a war, they 
act with troubled conscience, but later and only then claim excuses to escape blame. 
  
 McMahan concludes his treatment of excuses with this judgment. The usual 
combatants are unjustifiably complacent that their nations’ wars are just. Their 
negligence in deliberating about the matter makes them culpable or, at best, only partly 
excused. One way to make this complacency less likely is to institute that new world 
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court which would make internationally recognized pronouncements on where jus ad 
bellum lies. Knowing the judgment of this court, the would-be unjust combatant’s 
complacency would be destroyed and incentive and capability for careful deliberation 
would be increased. 
 
 
VI. Liability and the Limits of Self-Defense 
 
This is the title of McMahan’s fourth chapter. His general claim for the entire book is 
that the justifications for killing people in war are the same as the justifications for 
killing them accepted in domestic law. So it is with the relevance of excuses. His 
principle here is that a person who poses a threat of objectively wrongful harm is liable 
to be attacked in self-defense. However, if that person has no moral responsibility for 
the threat because he or she is acting under irresistible duress or in invincible ignorance, 
then proportionality controlling self-defense enters here. Thus: 1. A culpable threat is 
fully responsible and fully liable to even the defensive harm of being killed.   2. A 
partially excused threat is partially responsible and might best be incapacitated or 
allowed to die and not be killed. 3. A fully excused threat has no moral responsibility, 
has incurred no liability directly, and ideally should be simply avoided. However, if this 
innocent person’s threat cannot be avoided, there is a lesser evil justification for 
stopping or even killing this person provided by the principle of the double effect. 
 
McMahan holds that these distinctions make little difference on the battlefield. Any 
unjust combatant is a threat to objectively wrong a just combatant and thus has some 
liability to be killed. Few unjust combatants would be innocent threats, and the majority 
would be at least partially culpable for their negligence in not accepting the 
responsibility to carefully deliberate about why they are fighting. Also, the just 
combatants that the unjust combatants are trying to kill would not be able to detect 
moral differences in their enemies’ culpability on the battlefield. Only an omniscient 
observer could do this. Moreover, if the just combatants tried only to be lenient and 
incapacitate and not kill the attacking unjust combatants, the results might be that the 
just combatants are killed by the non-lenient unjust combatants, that only the unjust 
combatants live to fight on for the unjust cause, and that the just cause is lost. 
 
There might be one sort of battle in which fully excused unjust combatants could be 
identified and possibly incapacitated rather than killed. This would be a battle against a 
unit of cruelly-impressed child soldiers (common in Africa) that might possibly be 
encircled and forced to surrender.  Also, in the Persian Gulf War, the United States 
forces could know important moral differences in their Iraqi enemies. When the unjust 
combatants were a unit of ordinary conscripts rather than of the Republican Guard, U.S. 
commanders might have properly made the judgment that the conscripts were fully or 
partially excused and only the Republican Guards were fully culpable. There should 
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thus have been more restraint in fighting the conscripts and more opportunities to 
surrender offered them. 
 
Though excuses do not much benefit unjust combatants to protect them from being 
killed on the battlefield, excuses would make more of a moral difference to protect 
unjust combatants from liability to punishment after the war has ended. 
It would be a good thing to threaten unjust combatants for punishment after the war 
simply because they were combatants fighting for an unjust cause. This would help 
prevent wars because governments planning to violate jus ad bellum would find fewer 
soldiers to fight it.  
 
However, in the present state of international law, there are good reasons for not 
punishing unjust combatants, even those fully culpable or only partially excused, after 
the war. The unjust side might win the war, and most post-war justice, as at Nuremberg, 
is victor’s justice. So the unjust victor might claim that the just defenders were unjust 
combatants and punish them. And neither the government of the just nor unjust side 
would try its own soldiers for fighting in a war in which it had commanded them to 
fight.  
 
However, these objections could be avoided if the same, new, impartial international 
court that ruled on jus ad bellum before the war, could now try unjust combatants after 
the war. But this change would not be enough to justify trying the unjust combatants 
after the war. Unjust combatants fearing their post war trials have an incentive not to 
surrender and even more of an incentive to violate jus in bello and win the war, for a 
victor nation would not want its soldiers tried. Also, it would be enormously expensive 
and wasteful of scarce post-war resources needed for reconstruction to try all unjust 
combatants, even if it is morally imperative to try the few worst of them. Lastly, 
punishment should make recidivism less likely, but the usual unjust combatant has no 
tendency to be a recidivist. 
 
 
VII. Civilian Immunity and Civilian Liability 
 
This is the title of McMahan fifth and final chapter. Classical just war theory, in jus in 
bello, has a permission (combatants may be attacked at any time) and a prohibition 
(non-combatants, that is, civilians, may never be directly attacked. McMahon has 
already argued for his radical modifications of the permission based on his rejection of 
the moral equality of combatants. Unjust combatants may be attacked at most times, but 
perhaps not if they are fully excused the way innocent child soldiers are. Just 
combatants may not be attacked most times by unjust combatants, but usually may be 
attacked by unjust combatants if the just combatants are violating jus in bello by 
directly attacking enemy civilians.  
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In this chapter, McMahan argues for a significant modification of the prohibition 
protecting civilians. This modification is based on his principle that all those, and only 
those, who pose an objectively unjust threat of wrongful harm are legitimate targets in 
war. Some civilians are such threats. For it is not what an individual is, his status, that 
makes him a threat, it is what an individual does. Actions and not class membership is 
important to McMahan here. 
 
Which civilians become liable to attack under this principle?  In parallel with his 
creation of the class he names unjust combatants, McMahan names those civilians he 
considers liable to attack unjust civilians. These civilians would be instigators and 
aiders and abettors of unjust war. One such group would be familiar to classical just 
war theorists-- workers in the munitions plants of the aggressor. But so would scientists 
and engineers working for unjust aggressors in their laboratories at universities, 
working on weapons, some terrible and new. Also, some civilians have been such 
important instigators of war that, but for them, there would have been no war. 
McMahan thinks the executives of the United Fruit Company were this in 1954 when 
they moved the U.S. government to use covert operatives and mercenaries to overthrow 
the democratic government of  President Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala. 
 
It seems quite true that ordinary citizens in an aggressor nation do aid and abet unjust 
war even if in a lesser degree. They are jingoists, they vote for unjust war-makers, they 
pay taxes used for wars, they raise their sons and daughters to be uncritical unjust 
combatants, they are loyal subjects of their morally flawed rulers, they omit protesting 
even when they think it is morally due.  
 
There are, of course, permissible ways that just combatants may cause limited amounts 
of harm to the civilians of an unjust nation that is the aggressor in war. These civilians 
will permissibly suffer when dual-use targets in their nation are bombed, targets like 
railroads or fuel depots. They will permissibly suffer when their homes are bombed, if 
the intention was to bomb the munitions factory next to their homes. They will suffer 
from shortages brought on by war. They will suffer from their enemy’s use of economic 
sanctions, even if these are a poor weapon because they hurt the poor more than the 
rich. They will suffer, after defeat, from enemy occupation and forced reparations. It is 
in a way appropriate that some of these civilians suffer because they have some 
responsibility for the unjust war. In contrast, the citizens of the justly defending nation 
have no responsibility for the crime of war. 
 
Given all this, McMahon still does not think it morally permissible to directly attack 
unjust civilians in war. This is for plural reasons. 1. Most civilians have little 
responsibility for the aggression. 2. To attack civilians is usually to treat non-
threatening persons as if they were mere means and things. 3. To attack civilians to 
pressure their government to capitulate is of most uncertain effectiveness, for unjustly 
attacked civilians tend to be more resistant to surrender than non-attacked civilians. 
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This was true of both British and German civilians bombed in WW II. 4. Innocent 
civilians, especially children and the disabled, are so intermingled with responsible and 
unjust civilians that there is no proper discrimination possible in this civilian target. 
 
For these reasons, McMahan holds that it would never be permissible in practice to 
destroy a whole city like Tokyo, Hiroshima, or Nagasaki. These reasons also show that 
Osama bin Laden’s terrorist attacks on targets like the World Trade Center were wrong. 
A problem remains for McMahan. If what one does, rather than what one is, if actions 
and not membership, make one liable to attack, then some soldiers (e.g. army 
chaplains) would not be liable to attack and some civilians would be liable to attack 
(e.g. United Fruit executives).  Should the present norm of international law thus 
remain in legal and moral force, the prohibition on directly attacking any and all 
civilians in war? McMahan uses the last sentence of his book to answer yes. The 
absolute prohibition, in present circumstances, is a legal necessity. This is because, the 
way things now stand, unjust combatants, imagining themselves just combatants, would 
use this permission to disregard the absolute immunity of civilians to do great harm to 
just civilians.   
 
 
VIII. Reviewer’s Conclusion 
 
As I said in the introduction to this review, I am delighted to have discovered Killing in 
War. I might not have done so had I not been asked to review it, so I am thankful to 
David Boersema for requesting this of me. Discovering this book has allowed me to 
move to a new position in the ethics of war, a position towards which I was driven, but 
I had no suspicion that it existed. The total war and moral realism positions endorse a 
savagery that is repulsive to me, so I was driven into just war theory. But Michael 
Walzer’s version of just war theory was too permissive in its doctrine of supreme 
emergency. This allowed some of the British terror bombing of German civilians. I was 
thus forced towards the traditional Catholic just war position of John Ford, S.J, who 
condemned obliteration bombing, but accepted the moral equality of combatants. But 
reading McMahan has convinced me that his much less permissive just war position is 
better, better for not granting the moral equality of both just and unjust combatants, 
better for arguing that jus ad bellum is much more restrictive than classical just war 
theory allows. In working out his position, McMahan uses two doctrines that I was 
pleased to find in Walzer, but McMahan uses them in a much more astute way than 
Walzer uses them.  
 
 First is the domestic analogy. Shooting in war is like shooting at a crime scene where 
the police and armed robber exchange gunfire. Transferred to war, this clearly means 
that the defenders have the right to shoot and the aggressors do not, and so the 
defenders are the moral superiors of the aggressors. The aggressors, like the armed 
robber, must be convinced not to shoot. 
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Second is the basing of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the doctrine of human 
rights which McMahon usually calls moral rights. This means that the just defender 
retains the human right not to be harmed while the unjust aggressor forfeits the human 
right not to be harmed. In contrast, Walzer and the classical position hold erroneously, 
to my mind, that both aggressor and defender have lost the human right not to be 
harmed.  
 
McMahan’s new version of just war theory makes two demands of which I heartily 
approve. First, the demand on soldiers not to fight as aggressors and not to join a 
military that usually asks its soldiers to fight as aggressors. I think the U.S. military 
usually asks this. Second, the demand on governments and on their citizens to be much 
more careful in their moral deliberations before deciding to begin a particular war or to 
become the kind of government that usually fights unjust wars. This deliberation, and 
the information needed to do it right, must be made more readily available to the 
people. 
 
It is amazing to me that McMahan dedicates his book to his father who was a U.S. 
Marine, and that he conducted (presumably) continuing discussions with former and 
present military officers in the philosophy faculty at West Point.  I can only imagine 
that these soldiers would be enraged at his doctrines because these doctrines are so, so 
critical of the United States and its military. The soldier that asserted a right to 
selectively refuse to fight in a war ordered by the President, acceded to by the 
Congress, would seem to be the bitterly hostile and possibly traitorous enemy of our 
career military personnel.   
 
Lastly, McMahan’s book has given me the stopping point in just war theory for which I 
searched in order to condemn the immoral war President Reagan’s Contra mercenaries 
waged against the heroic and just Sandinista soldiers in Nicaragua in the 1980’s. But 
this stopping point has not completely stopped my movement towards pacifism. 
Pacifism still has a strong moral and prudential appeal to me. What sort of scheme 
could make pacifists of us all by preventing all war? Yet even here McMahan has 
something tantalizing to offer me--a really impartial and authoritative world court that 
decides in good time before war which side would be the aggressor and which would be 
the defender, and that decides on who deserves to be punished after a war. If such a 
court had world recognition, there might be much less war and war-related injustice in 
the world. 
 
 
 
